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ABSTRACT
Desktop search applications can contain cached copies of files that were
deleted from the file system. Forensic investigators see this as a potential
source of evidence, as documents deleted by suspects may still exist in the
cache. Whilst there have been attempts at recovering data collected by desktop
search applications, there is no methodology governing the process, nor
discussion on the most appropriate means to do so. This article seeks to address
this issue by developing a process model that can be applied when developing
an information extraction application for desktop search applications,
discussing preferred methods and the limitations of each. This work represents
a more structured approach than other forms of current research.
Keywords: Desktop search, digital evidence, extraction technique, process
model.
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Consumer electronics, especially computers and computer system components,
have become more affordable and capabilities have increased, particularly in
relation to storage. Smith (2004) shows that over four years, from April 2000
to April 2004, average hard drive capacities increased from 30GB to 250GB.
This phenomenal increase in storage capacity has enabled users to store all of
their data instead of deleting it to create space for new information they
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acquire. However, this increase in storage sees added complexity in the
management of files and user-created documents, and the market has
responded with increasingly powerful file search utilities to respond to this
need.
The first generation of desktop searching utilities operated in real-time, which
resulted in potentially lengthy search times. The second and current generation
of desktop search utilities, in the form of Windows Vista search, Google
Desktop Search, Spotlight and Beagle to name a few, are much like their
internet search counterparts except they catalogue information on personal
computers to allow fast searching of the indexed documents (Cole 2005). By
pre-indexing user-data and storing this information in a database-type file (or
files), these applications are able to search almost instantly. Information
indexed by these applications includes file location information, file meta-data,
and file content. As these devices are designed to store user-data, entire text
files and image thumbnails may exist independently of their original creation
area.
Unlike older desktop search utilities, the entire text of email, office documents,
text files and PDF documents may be stored, as well as metadata associated
with music and video files. Depending on which desktop search application is
used, thumbnails may also be stored. As discovered (Turnbull, Blundell & Slay
2006), particular search utilities, such as Google Desktop Search, may also not
purge their databases of a file when that file is deleted and keep a record of all
files on a machine. Whilst this is not part of any standard and may be altered in
more recent versions, it does give an insight into the value of forensic
investigation of these systems as a component of a full analysis.
Since desktop search engines are still a new area of software development,
there is little work that discusses these data stores as potential locations for
digital evidence, but there is the possibility that the cached information stored
by these applications can be of evidentiary use.
The extraction of data from desktop search utilities has the potential to be of
great use to investigators due to the nature of the cache in many of the desktop
search engines. The search applications continually index data on the machine
as the user creates and modifies content. This can include emails sent and
received from email clients, text documents, instant messaging conversations
and web browser caches. All of this data is stored independently of the original
electronic transaction, with the mechanisms for addition, updating and deleting
specific to the application. It is therefore dependent on the application as to
when such files are added and, as importantly, removed, from these file
structures.
The only other research into this area found that it is possible to extract
information from Google Desktop Search, a particular desktop search engine,
but only in a work-around fashion, that is manual, cumbersome and inefficient
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(Turnbull, Blundell & Slay 2006). The authors recommended that further work
be conducted into either examining the databases structure, to allow tools to be
developed to extract evidence directly, or to develop a plug-in for Google
Desktop Search that can access the information via the program executables. It
is important to note that this work was explicit to a specific desktop search
application, and the access methodology created was not universal or
generalisable. Each system differs in the paths it stores from, the parameters
for stored information, the format of storage and the circumstances under
which it will delete information.
The main problem found in this work was in the extraction of the information
from the storage mechanism in a forensically sound manner, and ensuring that
alteration has not further occurred, either through the application continually
indexing new information or ensuring that the interface itself did not interpret
data. In this work, it was discussed that allowing the applications to execute
could potentially purge cached deleted items from the storage mechanism or
overwrite older cached items with newer versions, and that this could
potentially lose timestamp information or data.
This research endeavours to answer the question:
•

Can information be data-mined from desktop search applications using
a variety of methods so that the information can be used to locate
evidence, and
• Can the process be verified to abide by forensic rules so that the
evidence is considered admissible in a court of law?
Specifically, it seeks to determine different potential methods from which a
desktop search application may be accessed, the appropriate order of
attempting each of these methods, and the technical implications and
ramifications that accomplish each process. This outcome is inline with other,
similar work (Reith, Carr & Gunsch 2002).
The primary outcome is a process model that determines the most appropriate
method of extracting data for forensic examiners, classified by search
applications and versions. The architecture is comprised of a series of
procedures detailing how to extract information from desktop search engines
index databases. Each procedure of the architecture is accompanied by
associated limitations and test plans.
It is hoped that a robust process model for the extraction of evidence from
desktop search applications will enable a more simple and consistent approach
for investigators handling these applications, as they are a new form of
application and are possibly not currently searched as a potential form of
evidence.
The next chapter of this work introduces the proposed process model, and
discusses each stage in turn. The third and final chapter of this work discusses
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the outcomes, future research challenges and concludes this work.
2. PROCESS MODEL FOR EXTRACTION APPLICATION
DEVELOPMENT

Figure 1 - Process model for developing information extraction applications for
desktop search engines.
It has been established at this point that no process model exists for the
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analysis of data from desktop search applications, but given the proprietary
nature of these applications and the lack of standardisation, a methodology
would be appropriate.
To answer the research questions, a process model defining how to develop
extraction applications for desktop search engines was developed. The initial
model, shown in Figure 1, represents the complete process followed to develop
an extraction application for a given desktop search engine.
Stage 1 is the key stage of the process, as the method of accessing the
information stored by the desktop search engine is selected, and all other
actions performed in other stages are dependent on the method selected. In this
model, three methods of data extraction from the desktop search application
were considered:

•
•
•

Reverse engineering the storage mechanism to allow for retrieval
Interfacing with the search engine via an API
Screen-scraping the application

Each of these was considered for forensic soundness and the completeness of
information extracted. Whilst ease of use was considered, the most complete
methods are given in order, from most to least desirable.
Stage 2 of Figure 1 examines the forensic risks of the selected access method
in stage 1, and defines ways in which the risks can be mitigated or negated.
This work is of importance as it highlights the strengths and weaknesses of
each approach, and the limitations that may be in place for different
investigators.
Stage 3 covers the exploration of the desktop search engine, documentation of
the search engine and third party information about the search engine to
determine the significance of extractable information, where initially the actual
data values of the information can be ambiguous.
Stage 4 provides sub-processes that determine what procedures can be used to
extract information from the search engine’s data store, based on the selected
access method.
Stage 5 involves resolving the issue of storing the information that will be data
mined from the search engine data store, and the subsequent querying of the
data to locate evidence.
The final stage, stage 6, is applicable to all access methods, hence the merging
of the individual flows into this single final sub-process. Stage 6 details how
the developed extraction application requires testing and validation, to ensure
that its operation maintains the integrity of data from the search engine data
store once it has been extracted, and that the extraction process does not
introduce risks to the forensic process.
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2.1 Stage 1: Access Method
The first action to consider when developing a software application for the
retrieval of information from a desktop search engine is the method in which
the stored information will be accessed. The implementation of this stage of the
process model will answer the first sub-question of the research: “For each
desktop search engine, can the parallel storage mechanisms be accessed? If so,
in what ways?”. The conceived options available for accessing the parallel
storage mechanism of a desktop search engine are: reverse engineer the search
engine data store (Process 1A), develop a plug-in for the application to utilise
the native search abilities (Process 1B) and develop a macro application that
simulates human user interaction with the application (Process 1C). Not all the
options are applicable to every desktop search application and furthermore,
each method does not have the same level of desirability.
2.1.1 Process 1A: Reverse Engineer the Search Engine Data Store
Reverse engineering, in a software engineering sense, is the process of deriving
a base set of requirements for a system from a pre-existing, already deployed
system by examining source code of the application, and other artefacts such as
documentation, test results and file systems [1]. The accrued requirements
from the reverse engineering process are then forward engineered to develop a
system that essentially performs the same as the reverse engineered system.
This process is employed to often bring legacy systems from non object
oriented approaches into modern object orientated based systems, to aid
continual development of the system. However, in this instance, investigators
are attempting to determine the format of files associated with the applications
so as to be able to analyse them directly without running a desktop search
application. Such direct access could allow access via independent applications
or as an additional feature of existing forensic examination applications. A
proposed outline of the proposed processes associated with the reverse
engineering sub-process are given in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 – Process model 1A: Reverse engineering a search engine data store.
2.1.1.1 Limitations of Reverse Engineering
The legality of reverse engineering is currently a highly debated topic. In the
United States, law 17 USC §1201 allows the reverse engineering of
applications for interoperability, similar to the Australian Copyright Act 1968,
Part III Division 4A Section 47D (1b) which allows reverse engineering for
developing interoperable applications. Whilst these rules would seem to allow
reverse engineering to be pursued when developing an extraction application,
the term interoperability could be debated in this case, since the extraction
application does not intend to match the functionality of the search engine, but
rather use the data for entirely different purposes. However, such legal issues
are jurisdictional and dependent on the country of use, and therefore their use
should not be immediately discounted, but approached with caution and
knowledge of current legislation (Cifuentes & Fitzgerald 2000).
Analysing assembly code and determining what libraries the application may
be using for its data storage is a time consuming task. Code analysis is also a
specialist skill and therefore not all law enforcement agencies will have
capacity or expertise to perform the task.
Another major limitation to reverse engineering is the potential encryption of
the data store of the search engine. Decompilation of the search engine and
data store may reveal the use of encryption by the search engine to encrypt
information it caches (Henrard, Englebert, Hick, Roland & Hainaut 1998). The
complexity of determining the encryption algorithms used from the decompiled
executables will in most cases be the primary motive to develop an extraction
application with one of the other access methods. By utilising one of these
other access methods, the issue of propriety encryption on the data store can be
eliminated. Since the extraction application will be retrieving information that
is normally intended for the end user, it will be in human readable form, as
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decryption will have been performed before returning the results of a query.
One means of mitigating the legal issues associated with the decompilation and
ensuring the accuracy of the outcome is through the support of the initial
application developer. Not only will this company understand the exact nature
of the files, but may be able to provide an application for extracting
information from them without altering files. To the researcher’s knowledge,
no company has publicly discussed such work.
2.1.2 Process 1B: Interfacing with Search Engine
All search operations bound for the desktop search application are handled by
the search engine component of the application. For some desktop search
applications, this search engine may be available for interfacing outside of the
native user interface of the application. As identified in Figure 3, access may
be available as an operating system service (such as a Windows service), as a
standalone component with a standard interfacing method (such as a web
server running on the local device) or the company may release a software
development kit (SDK) for developing applications that is able to interface
with the search application’s executables. If the search engine component is
designed as a service, then an SDK may be on offer from the application
vendor or the programming community may have developed a third-party one.

Figure 3 – Process model 1B: Interfacing with the search engine of the
application.
If an SDK is available, an application can then be implemented utilising the
SDK to retrieve information from the storage mechanism. If the search engine
has a standardised interfacing method, then the standard should be discerned
and an application should be developed following the protocols used to send
and retrieve information.

Limitations of Interfacing with the Search Engine
The major limitation of this approach is the reliance on the original search
application to extract and interpret data on behalf of the investigator. This
presupposes two issues; that the search application will continue indexing
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whilst operational, and that, without direct access to the data store, there is the
possibility that the desktop search application to filter or interpret results before
presentation.
Since the executables of the search application are now responsible for
retrieving requested information from the data store, the application needs to
be running for the interaction to occur. This poses a potential threat to the
forensic process, since the information retrieved could be modified by the
application during retrieval. Extended testing in a controlled system setup
would be required once the extraction application is developed. With the search
application running, it also poses the threat that the application is free to
continue its indexing policies. This could include deletion of cached items that
no longer exist on the file system, meaning potential evidence could be lost.
Some metadata could also be updated, such as timestamps, which would then
loose some evidentiary value. By developing an application with this approach
the risks would have to be assessed, managed and documented according to the
rules of evidence, so that any evidence correlated from extracted information is
admissible.
2.1.3 Process 1C: Interfacing with User Interface of Application via
Macros
Although previously discussed that it is a time consuming task for an
investigator to manually search for results from the application, the process can
be partially automated through the use of scripting languages that are capable
of replicating human interaction with system input devices through the use of
macros. These scripts, coupled with screen-scraping can be used to simulate
user input, and will attempt to capture search results returned from the
application. Screen scraping is the process of capturing the output of a screen
for use in another application and is traditionally used in computer systems reengineering to link new systems into older legacy systems without the need to
re-develop the old legacy system [2]. A proposed outline of events is given in
Figure 4.

Figure 4 - Process model 1C: Interfacing with user interface of desktop search
engine
The developed application would require routines for navigating every screen
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that the target search application generates, and the order in which the routines
flow, to match the application. This identification of screen flows and
development of scripts to extract the information is shown in Figure 4. Once
the navigation aspect is completed, data extraction methods (such as screen
scraping) need to be developed for text, images and other data types supported
by the application, also shown in Figure 4. Whilst the scripting languages are
capable of selecting and copying text from interfaces, images will need to be
handled via the incorporation of a screen capturing library into the extraction
application. For other data types that may be returned by the application,
intercepting and piping the output streams to file is one solution, however, this
may not be necessary as the purpose of the application in many cases is to
narrow the search field for manual inspection by an investigator.
2.1.3.1 Limitations of Interfacing with the User Interface
As with developing an application to extract information from the search
engine via the actual executables of the search application, the information
retrieved could be modified by the application. Again, if an extraction
application is developed by utilising the user interface, the risks arising from
this method will have to be managed and documented.
Developing a tool in this manner also requires a large amount of time, as every
possible scenario of screen navigation has to be catered for. Information
extraction will also be complex requiring a parser that is capable of
determining different result layouts for the multitude of file types that are
index-able by the application.
It is also noted that the issues related to running the desktop search application
in order to interact with it are still present here – the desktop needs to be
operational but it cannot still be indexing files, as doing so potentially reduces
the integrity of the output.
2.2 Stage 2: Mitigate Forensic Risks of the Access Method
Once the method for accessing the data stored within the storage mechanism of
the desktop search application has been determined, the forensic soundness of
the method needs to be investigated. Since the focus of this stage is to mitigate
forensic risks of the access method, following this process when developing an
extraction application will partially answers the third sub-question of the
research: “Are these access and extraction methods forensically sound, or can
any risks to the forensic process be mitigated sufficiently?”. This stage
involves the examination of key areas related to the desktop search application
that can help to decrease the magnitude of any identified threats to the integrity
of the information retrieved. As Figure 1 shows, each access method leads to a
separate process for mitigating risks in stage 2. Whilst there are identical
activities within the sub-processes of this stage there are also special cases that
are to be considered for each access method and hence individual sub-
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processes were warranted.
2.2.1 Process 2A: Mitigate Reverse Engineering Risks
The only step of this process is the determining of legal issues that may be
applicable to reverse engineering, and the subsequent resolving of these issues.
As previously mentioned, the legality of using the data store of a desktop
search engine for evidence is debated, as the usage may not be considered as
allowing true interoperability between applications, since the function of the
extraction tool is different from that of the search engine. The advice of a legal
professional should be sought so that clarity on the matter can be reached, and
the development of the extraction application can continue, or an alternative
access method can be selected. If this legal issue is ignored, and the application
is completed, then evidence obtained from the data store may be considered
inadmissible since it was obtained through illegal means.
2.2.2 Process 2B: Mitigate Search Engine Interfacing Risks
The initial step of this process, as shown in Figure 5, is to discover which files
and system entities (such as Windows registry entries) are used during the
standard operation of the desktop search application. This can be achieved by
using utilities that are part of the operating systems management features, or
through the use of third party applications such as Filemon1 and Regmon2.
These utilities will reveal what files the application reads and writes to during
start-up, whilst idle and when performing searches [3].

Figure 5 - Process model 2B: Mitigating forensic risks when interfacing with
search engine.
Since the access method of interfacing with the search require it to be running,
knowing which files are utilised by the application can help to manage the risk

Available at http://www.sysinternals.com/Utilities/Filemon.html
(October 2006)
2
Available at http://www.sysinternals.com/Utilities/Regmon.html
(October 2006)
1
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to the integrity of the information retrieved. If the files are known, an operating
system level change to the file permissions can be attempted to prevent any
writing to occur.
The second step identified in Figure 6 step is the configuring of the search
application’s indexing options. Parallel to the reasons for determining which
files the search application utilises, configuring the application can aid in
minimising the risk to the integrity of the information retrieved due to the
requirement of the application executables needed to be running.
Examination of the application’s configuration menu will assist in determining
what options could pose a threat to the information contained in the data store
of the application. Most search applications have configuration options for
deletion policies, specifying times when cached items are purged from the
cache. If possible, deletion should be disabled or the time limit should be
maximised. The indexing process itself should also be disabled, as files that are
cached but have been modified since being cached could then be updated by
the search application, overwriting valuable metadata such as timestamps.
The third step of the process defined in Figure 6 applies when developing an
extraction application that will utilise an SDK, either supplied by the vendor or
third-party, to interface with the search application. By thoroughly checking
supplied SDK documentation and example code utilising the SDK, there may
exist “read-only flags” for use in function calls to the search application. These
would be beneficial in ensuring that any interactions between the developed
extraction application and search application are guaranteed to leave all cached
information unmodified in the data store.
2.2.3 Process 2C: Mitigate Risks Interfacing via Macros
This process, shown in Figure 7, has the same initial steps as process 2B, but
has the third step of identifying the accuracy of the screen scraping methods
employed for the access method. If the macro scripting language used for the
access method does not have the ability to select and copy text from the search
engine’s user interface then an image capturing library should be in place to
overcome this.

Figure 6 - Process model 2C: Mitigating risks when interfacing with user
interface.
2.3 Stage 3: Determine Significance of Extractable Information
Once the method of accessing information has been selected and the forensic
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risks have been mitigated and documented, the third stage of this process is to
determine the significance of the extractable data. Whilst it is known and
appreciated that investigators must consider what information is to be extracted
before beginning use of this process model, the particulars of what information
is extractable is based upon the access method and what information is stored
in the individual implementation, which is dependent on which application is
used. What information is sought is therefore reliant on these factors, which
would not be known before these stages.
In some circumstances, it may be ambiguous as to what the actual extracted
information is related to. If the true meaning of the extracted information is not
known, and its significance is incorrectly identified, then false conclusions in a
forensic investigation may be drawn. This could lead to the discrediting of an
investigator’s testimony in court. If the significance is identified properly, this
risk to the forensic process can be mitigated. In this stage, all three access
approaches merge together, shown in Figure 7, as determining the meaning of
ambiguous information draws upon information sources used by all three
methods.

Figure 7 - Process model 3A: Determining the significance of extractable
information.
2.3.1 Process 3A: Discover Significance of Extractable Information
If it is ascertained that ambiguous data is present and the meaning of the data
can not be determined, the first action is to develop a controlled test database
with the desktop search engine, as shown in Figure 7. Creating this test
database is similar to the approach applied in process 1A (Figure 2) to
determine the schema of the data store. By gradually indexing selected files of
specific file types and documenting the search results returned by the desktop
search engine, conclusions can be drawn about how the desktop search engine
may alter some metadata of the indexed files such as timestamps. Timestamps
can be ambiguous if they are not descriptively labelled internally by the search
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engine and the time value they contain could be in reference to the creation of
the cached file in relation to the file system, or could be referring to the date
the file was indexed by the application and stored in the cache.
2.4 Stage 4: Data Extraction
The fourth stage of the model deals with the actual extraction of data from the
desktop search engine’s parallel storage mechanism. Following the processes
of this stage when developing an extraction application answers the second
sub-question of this research: “Can cached information be data mined from
parallel storage mechanisms created by desktop search engines?”. By
developing a method that can successfully extract information from a desktop
search engine, the extracted information can then be used in stage 5 to search
for evidence.
2.4.1 Process 4A: Data Extraction Method for Reverse Engineering
Approach
Data extraction from desktop search engines where a reverse engineering
approach has been selected is the most straightforward approach, consisting of
only one option, to directly extract data. Since the structure of the data store is
known due to reverse engineering, the extraction application can be developed
to read directly from the files containing the cached information. This in effect
simulates the approach the actual search engine would use to retrieve the
information for the user.
2.4.2 Process 4B: Data Extraction Method for Interfacing with Search
Engine

Figure 8 - Process model 4B: Data extraction method for interfacing with
search engine.
For an application that has not been reverse engineered, a data mining
approach to information extraction will need to be selected. Since the
information can not be extracted directly from the storage mechanism, but via
the application itself, an automated process that queries the application is
needed.
2.4.2.1 Wildcard Search
A wildcard search is the first option to consider, as seen in Figure 8. This is the
simplest method of data mining the search application; however, it is not
applicable to all search applications. By creating a query that utilises a
wildcard operator, all results stored in the search applications data store will be
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returned. The exact formatting of the wildcard search term will vary between
search applications, and will have been determined in stage three. Commonly,
the * character is used as the wildcard operator and in some cases, may be used
in conjunction with file types (i.e. *.txt).
2.4.2.2 Brute Force / Dictionary Search
This method of data mining the search application is more involved than
wildcard searching but should be applicable to most search applications. Figure
8 shows this search option as the second option to be considered in process 4B.
Dictionary search is a similar concept to a dictionary attack, where a dictionary
of words are used by themselves, or concatenated together, in an attempt to
gain access to a computer system by an attacker [4, p. 407]. By using a
dictionary of search terms, brute force is applied to the search application and a
large magnitude of search requests are made, many returning results previously
returned. The dictionary is a plain text file, or series of plain text files, read by
the extraction application. The files contain a list of words in the common
language of the locale of the law enforcement agency (i.e. English, French,
Spanish, etc.), a list of common misspellings for words from the locale, a list of
file types and a list of case related terms such as suspect names and victim
names. Depending on the scale of the crime and the people involved, multiple
language files may be needed for searching. The extraction application would
iterate through the words listed in the dictionary files and format them into
queries for the search application, where it is processed and a result set is
returned. The result set returned by each query may contain information on a
cached file, already returned by a previous query. This is due to multiple search
terms being present in the same cached file. This problem is dealt with in stage
five.
2.4.2.3 Linear Search
This last devised data mining approach is not applicable to all desktop search
applications. It is intended for use where as part of the metadata for a cached
item, there exists a unique identifier. This identifier is usually used by the
application to retrieve the item from the storage mechanism. The first identifier
used by the application in most situations will be 0, but depending on the
implementation and indexing operations that have occurred, it may be greater
than 0 as the item at 0 may have been purged from the cache and the identifier
0 is not used again. The last identifier can be determined by checking the
statistics of the application to acquire the number of items that have been
cached. However as with the first identifier, this may not provide a true
indication as to the last identifier due to indexing operations. If this is the case,
then using an arbitrary large number much greater in magnitude than the
number of cached items can be substituted. Using the first identifier value and
last identifier value in an iterative loop, queries can be generated based on the
identifiers and individual items will be returned. If the initial and final
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identifiers are not accurate due to the aforementioned reasons, returned results
will have to be checked for empty or null values.
2.4.2.4 Selecting Search Method
The last step of process 4B is to select the search method after evaluating all
the possible options in the previous steps. A combination of search methods
may be selected in this process if it is decided that a single method will not
return enough information in the query results.
2.5 Stage 5: Storing and Querying Extracted Data
Once the method for data mining has been selected, the fifth stage determines
the method for storing the extracted information, so that it can be queried by an
investigator or other forensic software tool to determine if there is any
information of evidentiary value. This stage of the model attempts to answer
the last part of the main research question: “Is it possible to extract information
from desktop search applications parallel storage mechanisms, in a forensically
sound manner, so that it can be used as evidence?” By developing the ability to
query extracted information, it can then be analysed for evidence and used
during a forensic investigation.
2.5.1 Process 5A: Storing and Querying Data from Reverse Engineering

Figure 9 - Process model 5A: Storing and querying data from reverse
engineering.
The first option to consider when storing and querying retrieved data from a
reverse engineering approach, is whether or not querying the data in place is
sufficient. The reverse engineering process will allow the information to be
read directly from the storage mechanisms of desktop search engines.
Therefore, the requirement to store extracted data may be redundant if a
method for querying the data in place is available. If such a querying method
does not exist, process 5B should be followed to select a storage and query
method for extracted data. This process is modelled in Figure 9.
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2.5.2 Process 5B: Storing and Querying Extracted Data from Other Access
Methods

Figure 10 - Process model 5B: Storing and querying extracted data from other
access methods.
For non-reverse engineering based extraction applications, or when accessing
the data store in place is insufficient for a reverse engineered approach, there
are three conceived methods for storing and querying retrieved information as
shown in Figure 10. The first step for all three is to determine a unique
identifier for each search result. If the search method utilises a linear search
through the use of item identifiers supplied by the search application, then this
is likely to be the best unique identifier. If this is not available, a file’s URL
which will either be filename and path or URL of the website (if the search
application caches visited sites), can be used to create the unique identifier,
since two files with the exact same name and path can not exist.
There are three alternatives, each with its own advantages and disadvantages;
Database, a custom file format, and outputting as plain text. The advantage of a
database is that all data would be in an accessible format optimised for
searching, but the disadvantage is that many forensic analysis tools may not be
able to directly interface with a database for searching purposes. The use of a
custom file format may be preferable for some situations, particularly where
the file format is interoperable with other custom tools, however, the
disadvantages are a lack of interoperability with known standards and, as
information is not stored in a flat format, it might not be directly searchable by
other applications. Plain text is searchable, but loses the speed and ubiquity of
a database-stored system. The use of XML to provide structure to such a file
would mitigate or reduce many of these disadvantages.
A solution to avoiding the disadvantages of each of these file formats would be
to save any extracted information in multiple ways.
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2.6 Stage 6: Verifying the Forensic Soundness of the Developed Extraction
Application

Figure 11 - Process model 6A: Verifying the forensic soundness of the
developed extraction application.
With the functionality of the developed extraction application completed, the
final step is to verify that the operations of the extraction application are
forensically sound. This stage answers the main research question by proving
that the developed extraction application does not modify the information read
from the search engine data store. This validation is performed in two parts:
creating a test environment to see what information is modified by the search
application upon indexing and comparing generated hash values of the data
store files from before and after the extraction application operates.
2.6.1 Controlled Testing Environment
This first test utilises a ‘garbage in, garbage out’ philosophy to determine if the
information retrieved by extraction process is modified in any way from the
original file that was cached [5, p. 13.3]. Creating a test environment will vary
between search applications, but the main goal is to limit the indexing
performed by the application to one test file of which the contents and
metadata are known. With the search application configured and the file
created, the indexing process should be started by the application. When
completed, the developed extraction application should be executed to retrieve
all the information available, which will be the one file.
Retrieved information then needs to be compared against the original file. Any
differences in metadata or cached content need to be documented, and
explanations for the differences need to be concluded. Metadata that differs
may already have been documented in stage 3 of the process model, when
determining the significance of the data. These changes should already be
accounted for in the expected output of the retrieval application. Any
unexpected modifications may require debugging of the developed application
to resolve the problem, and if not possible due to utilisation of third-party code,
the changes and their impacts on the integrity and meaning of possible
evidence need to be documented.
2.6.2 Checksum Comparison
This essential test ensures that the developed extraction application does not
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modify any of the files of the search application’s data store. If the application
modifies the cache files then it can be claimed that the evidence has been
tampered with to pervert the course of justice, since incriminating information
could have been injected into the retrieved data. Since the use of MD5 and
SHA1 (either individually or in combination) are accepted methods of ensuring
duplications of seized media are exact copies. Due to the near-impossible
collision chance when generating unique hash values, they provide an accurate
test to ensure the retrieval application does not modify the search application’s
files (Carrier & Spafford 2004). Forensically, taking hashes of all database files
used by applications before and after analysis may ensure that the act of
accessing them (using the different methods as described within the process
model) has not altered or tainted these in any way. The use of hash values is
especially important in situations as described by [6] where a copy of Google
Desktop Search was run on the database files from another machine, and
examiners needed to ensure that the application itself was not updating files
and indexing new data from the investigator’s machine.
3. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
3.1 Future Research
The process model developed is the first attempt at providing a series of stages
to consider when developing an evidence extraction application for desktop
search engines. As such, it is a high level focus on the major issues faced when
developing said applications. The scope of the research limited the scope of
initial model, which allows greater future work into reviewing and extending
of the model. As new desktop search engines are released by developers,
extraction applications will need to be developed by applying the model.
Through the application of this model to new desktop search engines, it may be
found that other access methods and associated stages can be added to the
model, to extend the usefulness of the model for future use on desktop search
engines. By developing new extraction applications with the model, new
overlooked sub-processes can be added to the model derived from anecdotal
evidence obtained during development of the extraction applications. These
further contributions will aid in expedient future development of extraction
applications when following the process model.
However, as noted by Turnbull et. al [6], the release of the Windows Vista
operating systems, with built in comprehensive desktop search functionalities,
may reduce the need for the model developed in this research. If powerful
desktop search capabilities are provided by default with the popular operating
system, the numbers of users of alternative products may be impacted. As it
currently stands though, there are a variety of desktop search applications
thriving, and implementing an extraction tool for each one can be beneficial for
law enforcement agencies to have access to every piece of evidence that is
possible.
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3.2 Conclusion
Forensic computing is a reactive field that must keep up to date with the latest
consumer technologies and software. Criminals find novel ways to use these
technologies and if left unaddressed, they can conduct illicit business without
fear of prosecution (Kruse II, Heiser, 2002; Marcella & Greenfield 2002). One
such category of consumer software is desktop search engines. Functioning
like Internet search engines, they index files on a hard disk to make locating
the files easy. However previous research found that there could be forensic
value in the information indexed by desktop search engines. Desktop search
engines could contain cached copies of deleted files, which could be of great
use to forensic investigators if a seized computer has a desktop search
application installed. The research suggested a method of accessing one brand
of desktop search engine, Google Desktop Search, but noted that better
methods should be devised and for a variety of applications.
This research aimed to devise these better methods for extracting information
from desktop search applications. The key output of this research is a process
model that details the stages of development that should be undertaken when
developing a desktop search evidence extraction application. The devised
model focused on 6 stages of the development process, which define all
methods of extracting data from this valuable and largely forgotten source.
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